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Nuclear Energy Readiness Indicator Index (NERI):                           
A benchmarking tool for assessing nuclear capacity in developing countries1
 
Lisa Saum-Manning 
Brookhaven National Laboratory 
  
Declining natural resources, rising oil prices, looming climate change and the 
introduction of nuclear energy partnerships, such as GNEP, have reinvigorated global 
interest in nuclear energy.  The convergence of such issues has prompted countries to 
move ahead quickly to deal with the challenges that lie ahead.  However, developing 
countries, in particular, often lack the domestic infrastructure and public support needed 
to implement a nuclear energy program in a safe, secure, and nonproliferation-conscious 
environment.  How might countries become ready for nuclear energy?  
 
What is needed is a framework for assessing a country’s readiness for nuclear energy. 
This paper suggests that a Nuclear Energy Readiness Indicator (NERI) Index might serve 
as a meaningful basis for assessing a country's status in terms of progress toward nuclear 
energy utilization under appropriate conditions.  
 
The NERI Index is a benchmarking tool that measures a country’s level of “readiness” 
for nonproliferation-conscious nuclear energy development.  NERI first identifies 8 key 
indicators that have been recognized by the International Atomic Energy Agency as key 
nonproliferation and security milestones to achieve prior to establishing a nuclear energy 
program.2   It then measures a country’s progress in each of these areas on a 1-5 point 
scale.  In doing so NERI illuminates gaps or underdeveloped areas in a country’s nuclear 
infrastructure with a view to enable stakeholders to prioritize the allocation of resources 
toward programs and policies supporting international nonproliferation goals through 
responsible nuclear energy development.   
 
On a preliminary basis, the indicators selected include: 1) demonstrated need; 2) 
expressed political support; 3) participation in nonproliferation and nuclear security 
treaties, international terrorism conventions, and export and border control arrangements; 
4) national nuclear-related legal and regulatory mechanisms; 5) nuclear infrastructure; 6) 
the utilization of IAEA technical assistance; 7) participation in regional arrangements; 
and 8) public support for nuclear power. 
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2 “Milestones in the Development of a National Nuclear Power Infrastructure,” IAEA Nuclear Energy 
Series, No. NG-G-3.1,  2007. 
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In this paper, the Index aggregates the indicators and evaluates and compares the level of 
readiness in seven countries that have recently expressed various degrees of interest in 
establishing a nuclear energy program.3
 
The NERI Index could be a valuable tool to be utilized by: 1) country officials who are 
considering nuclear power; 2) the international community, desiring reassurance of a 
country’s capacity for the peaceful, safe, and secure use of nuclear energy; 3) foreign 
governments/NGO's, seeking to prioritize and direct resources toward developing 
countries; and 4) private stakeholders interested in nuclear infrastructure investment 
opportunities. 
 
Demonstrated Need 
 
The NERI Index captures demonstrated need by examining such indicators as a country’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), economic growth rates, and electricity demand.  It also 
takes into account accessibility to fossil fuels and the impact that diminishing energy 
supplies have had on a country’s citizens.  For example, in the past several years, citizens 
in a number of developing countries have experienced sharp rises in fuel prices and 
electricity shortages, sparking mass demonstrations, violence and in some cases, death.  
 
Governments that cannot provide an environment in which adequate energy is supplied 
hamper economic growth and threaten political stability. Thus the pressure to satisfy 
increasing demand for energy may indicate that officials will be more responsive to 
considering alternative sources of power, including nuclear energy.   
 
The NERI Index ranks a country’s demonstrated need based on a combined assessment 
of these factors using a scale of 1-5, where: 
 
 1=little need  3=moderate need  5=strong demonstrated need 
 
Political Support 
 
Demonstrated need must be backed by strong and consistent political support at the 
highest levels of government.  It is essential that government officials declare their 
commitment to developing a nuclear energy program and spell out their intentions in a 
clearly mapped out long term energy plan.  The energy plan should articulate intentions 
to develop only peaceful uses of nuclear energy and demonstrate that officials are 
prepared and capable of providing a safe and secure environment in which to do so.   
 
Public declarations of political support form the basis of a credible national position to 
develop a nuclear energy program.  Such statements hold officials accountable for their 
actions and reassure the international community of the government’s commitment to 
become responsible custodians of nuclear technology.  Publicly declared political support 
may also help convey that leaders will be open and transparent regarding their country’s 
                                                 
3 While the countries examined are not identified in this paper they represent a range of “readiness.” 
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nuclear activities, which serves to allay both regional and international concerns about a 
country’s intentions.   
 
The NERI Index ranks a country’s political support on a 1-5 scale, based on the quality 
and consistency of political statements made about nuclear energy by senior government 
officials.  Political support is measured as follows: 
 
1=little political support   3=moderate political support      5=strong political support 
 
 
 
Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security Commitments 
 
Becoming an NPT party and concluding a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) 
are the sine qua non to establishing a nuclear energy program under conditions that 
provide critical assurance of peaceful use.  The conclusion of an IAEA Additional 
Protocol further builds mutual confidence and demonstrates states’ commitments to 
internationally accepted nonproliferation norms.  Indeed, President Bush proposed in 
2004 that “only states that have signed the Additional Protocol be allowed to import 
equipment for their civilian nuclear programs.” 
 
Policy makers further signal their intentions to provide a safe and secure environment for 
nuclear energy by participating in other treaties, conventions and agreements such as: the 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its recent 
amendment, the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT), and regional agreements such as the Treaty on the Southeast Asia 
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty).  
 
A country’s participation in major International Terrorism Conventions serves as an 
indicator of its readiness to prevent, deter, and punish terrorist activities. The Convention 
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and its recent amendment, and the 2007 
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism are examples 
that relate directly to potential dangers that might arise in countries that possess nuclear 
material.  
 
Adherence to the principles of UNSCR 1540 elucidates the level of commitment to sound 
systems of control on relevant nuclear related commodities, including export control 
policies. Participation in export control arrangements, such as the Zangger Committee or 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group, also demonstrates that a country recognizes the importance 
of controlling, monitoring, and documenting the transfer of nuclear material, equipment, 
and technology.    
 
Participation in bilateral arrangements such as the U.S.-led Megaports Initiative or 
Container Security Initiative suggests that the country is addressing maritime security to 
deny proliferators transit and sanctuary at sea. Sharing information regarding nuclear 
smuggling with the International Tracking Database (ITDB) further demonstrates a 
country’s commitment to prevent and deter proliferation activities.  
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It is important to note that becoming a signatory to such arrangements is a necessary, but 
not sufficient indicator of a country’s willingness or ability to comply with internationally 
recognized safeguards, safety, and security norms. (Bringing these agreements into force 
and putting in place the appropriate legal instruments and infrastructure to implement 
these commitments is a key factor that will be discussed below). Nonetheless, examining 
the treaties, conventions and agreements in which a country participates sheds light on 
the country’s willingness to abide by its international safety and security obligations. 
 
The NERI Index factors in a country’s status with respect to relevant treaties, conventions 
and agreements, with a view to illuminate the level and scope of its commitment to 
international nonproliferation and safety norms.  Treaty participation is measured as 
follows: 
 
1=minimal participation 3=moderate participation 5=strong participation 
 
 
National Legal Mechanisms  
 
Countries preparing for nuclear energy should enact a comprehensive set of atomic laws 
and nuclear-related regulations and establish an appropriate regulatory function.  A 
country must also update penal codes and enable law enforcement to detain and punish 
transgressors effectively and in an efficient manner, including the allocation of liability in 
the event of a nuclear accident.   
 
The NERI Index assesses the quality of national nuclear-related legal mechanisms by 
determining if countries have enacted and effectively implemented laws covering safety, 
security, liability, and commercial aspects of a nuclear energy program.  A country that 
has adopted and implanted such legal mechanisms signals that it is aware of its 
responsibilities and up to the challenge of maintaining a safe and secure nuclear energy 
program. 
 
Legal mechanisms are measured as follows: 
 
1=minimal level   3=moderate level  5=strong level 
 
National Infrastructure 
 
The NERI Index factors in the existence (or lack thereof) of the necessary infrastructure 
to sustain a nuclear energy program.  It evaluates national nuclear institutions such as the 
country’s atomic energy commission, and examines its ability to formulate policy, and 
oversee the general direction of civilian nuclear technology use within the country.   
 
It also examines whether a country has an independent regulatory body, and evaluates its 
State System of Accounting and Control (SSAC), national nuclear research centers, and 
radioactive waste facilities.   
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NERI further considers the amount of available human resources to manage, operate, 
maintain, and regulate a nuclear energy program.  Additionally, it takes into account a 
country’s electrical grid capacity to determine if nuclear power is a feasible option given 
electricity-generating constraints. 
 
All of these indicators help determine the status of existing national infrastructure.  The 
combined amount of infrastructure is measured as follows: 
 
1=minimal amount   3=moderate amount  5=large amount 
 
IAEA Technical Assistance  
 
Though a developing country might not yet have the necessary infrastructure in place, it 
may have enlisted IAEA support to help build its capacity.  The Agency’s Technical 
Cooperation (TC) Programme offers a wide variety of technical assistance, from 
agricultural projects like “Mutation Breeding of Horticultural Crops”, to medical 
applications like “Strengthening Medical Physics through Education and Training.”  The 
TC Programme also supports nuclear energy-specific projects such as nuclear power 
feasibility studies, assistance in the preparation of regulatory frameworks, and human 
resource training and development.    
 
NERI examines the type of TC projects conducted within a country.  This element of 
NERI is an indicator of preparedness and intent, the former because the TC projects build 
relevant capacity and the latter because States that choose nuclear energy related projects 
must reduce their TC activity in other areas.  The percentage of nuclear energy-related 
projects is compared to the other types of TC assistance requested by the country and is 
measured as follows: 
 
1=low percentage  3=moderate percentage  5=high percentage 
 
Regional/ Bilateral/Private Industry Cooperation 
 
Participation in regional networks gauges outreach as an indicator of interest in nuclear 
energy development.  By providing educational, training and information exchange 
opportunities, regional nuclear networks promote cooperation, build trust, and help 
extend security assurances between neighboring countries.  Some examples of nuclear 
networks in developing regions include: the South-East European Nuclear Physics 
Network, the Asian Nuclear Safety Network (ANSN), and the Regional Co-operative 
Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America 
(ARCAL). 
 
A successful nuclear energy development program also depends on a country’s ability to 
procure funding, resources, and other forms of support, typically through bilateral 
arrangements with countries that have well-established nuclear programs.   
 
Additionally, private industry investment and financing arrangements by international 
organizations also help indicate the level of country preparedness.  
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The NERI Index combines the amount of regional participation in nuclear networks and 
bilateral and private industry cooperation as a single indicator and measures it as follows: 
 
1=low level       3=moderate level     5=high level  
 
Public Support 
 
In some countries, widespread opposition by environmentalists, religious groups and 
local citizens have had a negative impact.  At times, it has played a part in pressuring 
governments to abandon the pursuit of nuclear power altogether.   However, this 
indicator may not carry as much weight in countries with closed governments, where 
public expression is suppressed and plays a lesser role in determining a government’s 
decisions. Consequently, the weight of this indicator may vary from country to country.  
In this preliminary example, it is measured equally to the previous indicators: 
 
1=minimum public support    3=moderate public support     5=strong public support 
 
Visualization of NERI 
 
The principle aim of the NERI Index is to help identify strengths and weaknesses in a 
country’s nuclear power development program with a particular focus on 
nonproliferation.   Figure 1 below offers an example of how the Index might look in a 
single country.4
 
Figure 1 
 
                                                 
4 More might need to be said about the causal relationship—the fact that some of the indicators no doubt 
influence the others.  For example, a low level of regional/bi/industry cooperation might be caused by, or at 
least related to, the fact that the country is lacking in declared political support.  Neverthelss, treating the 
results of indicators separatley may still prove useful in identfing areas requiring improvement. 
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The chart provides a sort of snapshot of development, or, a progress report for Country A.  
The results suggest that Country A is taking a top-down approach to nuclear energy 
development, adopting international treaties and declaring a significant amount of 
political support.  However, it appears that the country lacks the domestic capacity to 
implement its international obligations.  The chart indicates that Country A requires 
improved legal mechanisms and nuclear infrastructure.  It further indicates that Country 
A received minimal IAEA technical support, which, if increased, might raise the level of 
progress in the other areas that signal readiness. 
 
Applying NERI to a group of neighboring countries helps place a country’s status in a 
regional context.  A comparison of a country’s NERI scores might look something like 
Figure 2 below.  
 
 
Figure 2 
 
NERI Indicator  Scores
Country Need Political
Support
Intl’
Treaties
Legal Infra‐
structure
IAEA Regional / 
Bilateral/  
Private 
Industry  
Cooperation
Public 
Support
Country A 2 4 5 1 1 2 2 2
Country B 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 3
Country C 2 2 4 4 4 2 3 2
Country D 3 3 2 1 2 2 2 3
Country E 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1
Country F 4 5 3 2 4 4 5 5
Country G 3 5 3 2 3 4 5 2
  
 
 
The breakdown in Figure 2 allows for a side-by-side comparison of countries across the 
eight indicator fields and depicts a wide range in terms of nuclear energy readiness across 
the countries assessed.  In this regional example, Country B appears far more advanced in 
terms of most of the readiness indicators, however it still might seek improvements to its 
efforts to ramp up public support. In contrast, the Index illuminates weaknesses in every 
indicator field in Country E 
 
9 
 
Figure 3 below aggregates countries’ scores in each indicator field and then ranks the 7 
countries in terms of their overall readiness for establishing a nonproliferation-conscious 
nuclear energy program. 
 
Figure 3 
 
NERI Rankings
Country NERI RANKING (from most to 
least ready)
B 1
F 2
G 3
C 4
A 5
D 6
E 7
  
 
 
Figure 3 shows that, if all indicators are weighted equally, Country B is the most 
regionally prepared country for the introduction of nuclear energy.  Country E is far less 
advanced and will likely require increased attention if it is to become ready to provide a 
secure and non-proliferation conscious environment for nuclear energy.   
 
Whether the results suggest that efforts should be targeted toward the least or most 
prepared developing country is a policy question to be determined by stakeholders who 
are in a position to take action.  Nevertheless, an assessment of the status of safeguards 
and other nonproliferation goals in the developing world will help the US, IAEA and 
other supplier countries to attain a comprehensive understanding of the nuclear-relevant 
needs of developing countries and help to determine where best to focus capacity-
building, funding, and other program support activities.   
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